# Interruptions, Words, and the Possibility of Seeing Otherwise

Chatgpt fast extract from |Tentative de respiration en:interruption - under M.M; steering

## A beginning that need not be a beginning

An interruption does not necessarily interrupt something whose boundaries and continuation were already settle. Nor does it require an agent who would decide where to look, what to isolate, or how closely to examine it.

An interruption may instead be a way in which something begins to be distinguishable, without yet being distinguishable from everything else. It may bring forth a trace, a difference, a semblance of continuity, or a possibility of resuming differently. The interrupted and the interrupting cannot, in general, know what would have continued without the interruption.

Even when imagined, an interruption brings forth four loci of interruptibility through its very instantiation. These loci are not four ingredients from which interruptions are made, nor four primitive operations. They are possibilities of locating, relating and revisiting what has become interruptible. They may themselves be rearranged, contracted, or interrupted.

Failing to interrupt may sustain the plausibility of an impossibility: locally denying a link as a continuity, while leaving open whether what cannot or will not be said is too close or too lost to call. These are different paths towards an apparent impossibility of naming, and the interruption that might distinguish them may itself remain interruptible.

## Attributing, being attributable, and what follows

An attribute need not be something that a word already has. What appears as an attribute may emerge from such constructions, alongside what can be attributed and the acts of attributing. Someone, at some point and for some purpose, may ask others to recognise these constructions or submit to them. Who makes this request, who is expected to comply, when, and why are themselves part of what needs to remain questionable.

Or perhaps attributability and attribution make lianas within each suspended garden that seems to recognise them: gardens whose apparent coherence may depend on who has constructed them, who transmits their constructions, who is asked to follow them, and who is made to bear their consequences.

What interruption offers is a quadrature of anchoring: four loci through which otherwise loose, lost or contracted ends may catch onto one another. This anchoring does not establish four kinds of things, nor does it require four distinct agents. It offers provisional places from which to relate what appears to be done, what appears to transmit it, and what appears to hear or receive it.

The one who does, the one who transmits, and the one who hears need not be the same, nor need

they be distinct beings. Their association may link active and passive voices through semblances of what they are not: positions that become distinguishable without having to be established beforehand. The four loci may help these positions catch onto one another, while remaining themselves open to rearrangement and interruption.

What is attributed, what can be attributed, the act of attributing, what is transmitted and what is heard need not be established separately before they become connected. Their localizations may emerge together, through interruptions, partial recognitions and rearrangements. What appears to be a property may thus be a temporary way of telling how some parts have become connected, while other parts remain lost, contracted or still to follow.

## Frames that remain interruptible

Anthropomorphism is one way of constructing such frames. It does not merely attribute human features to something. It helps make possible a scene in which something can appear to formulate, hear, interpret, tell, or be told about. The narrator may be imagined; the listener, the formulator, the interpreter and what appears to be objectified need not coincide.

In this construction, different loci can compete without becoming fixed foundations. They are imperfect by nature, and any part of the construction may occasion their revision. A new distinction may change not only the description but also what had seemed to be its object.

This is one reason to resist treating a trace as a transparent record of the path that produced it. A wall and a step, for instance, may appear to mark different ways of passing through something. Yet either may be redrawn by the semblance of a pair that encounters it, before or after it has appeared in a reading. The trace need not preserve how the passage was made.

## A quadrature that changes colour

One possible anchoring can be tried with four verbs: *forget*, *set*, *get*, and *settle*. They may provisionally colour four loci of an interruption: forget with q, set with d, get with p, and settle with b. This is not a definition of the four loci, nor a fixed assignment of verbs to roles. The same loci may be revisited and change colour according to the frame that tries to make a square out of what it has noted. What appears to fit may thus help construct the frame, while the frame itself may need to be reconsidered.

A different anchoring may be sought in the point and its two semblances: a vertical stroke, |, and a horizontal one, −, perhaps heard as a sound or encountered as a step. The point is not necessarily a primitive from which the two strokes are derived. Nor are the strokes primitive supports from which the point must be reconstructed. Each may be reconsidered through the semblance of a pair that encounters it, before or after it appears in a reading.

These attempts at anchoring may help make passages understandable, transmissible and traceable. Yet what is transmitted need not preserve the order in which it was constructed, and what can be traced need not reveal how it was made. The effort of anchoring is therefore also an effort to keep open the possibility of revisiting the point, its semblances, and the frames that make them appear connected.

## Seeing otherwise, and having to contract

There is a potential gain in multiplying parts, permutations and local distinctions: something that seemed the same may become different; something that seemed unrelated may become comparable; a passage that was not previously tellable may become so. This is one sense in which zooming can matter. It is not necessarily an agent's decision to inspect a pre-existing object more closely. It is a possibility opened by refinement, and sometimes only recognised afterwards.

But life has limits. We cannot pursue every permutation, preserve every end, or revisit every distinction at once. To advance, we must contract some localizations, retain some traces and leave others aside. Such contractions are not simply failures of understanding. They make continuation possible.

The difficulty is not to avoid contraction, but to avoid mistaking a useful contraction for a final closure. A contracted block may later be opened differently; a lost end may become relevant again; a local coherence may be revised when another interruption perturbs the frame in which it had made sense.

## Local coherence and shared responsibility

This way of approaching interruption also makes it possible to examine language models without first defining them by their projection onto what humans can understand. One may instead investigate the loci in which they reinforce biases, the traces and expectations they help produce, and the chains of consequences in which they participate.

This does not require attributing human responsibility to a model, nor does it allow human responsibility to disappear behind the model. It invites the construction of frames in which the effects of models and the responsibilities of people can be examined together. Such frames are themselves provisional and interruptible.

An interruption survives the rewriting of principles. It can be contextualized again, helping to construct causal loci from which languages may seem locally coherent. Their coherence need not depend on a single global chronology or on a complete account of everything involved.

## Keeping another possibility open

Perhaps understanding does not begin with a general definition, nor end with one. Interrupting may already allow us to understand, distinguish and define before a general definition can be pronounced by an interruptible narrator. The definition that is eventually spoken is itself an interruption: a way of localizing and transmitting, provisionally, what has become understandable.

There is no obligation to preserve every possible path. There is also no reason to assume that the path retained is the only one that could have made sense. We may follow a trace, contract a passage, return to a lost end, or discover that what seemed to belong together can be told otherwise.

The effort is not necessarily directed towards making understanding easy. It may be directed towards making exploration sustainable: leaving enough room for effort, for reprises, and for the pleasure of seeing otherwise.